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I. INTRODUCTION
The intent of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment was
to ensure equality of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as
a basis for discrimination.1 If ratified, the ERA would have man-
dated the revision or repeal of federal and state laws treating
women and men differently and directly incorporated the con-
cept of sexual equality into judicial interpretation.' On June 30,
1982, the period for ratification of the proposed ERA expired.
Although thirty-five states endorsed the amendment, without
1. R. RATNER, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN 2 (1980).
2. B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW;
THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON STATE LAWS 1 (1977).
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
approval of the required thirty-eight, the measure was defeated.
In light of the ERA's defeat, it is important to examine the
adequacy of existing federal legislation protecting women from
sex discrimination and to determine whether a broad national
policy is still necessary. This note discusses the scope of federal
statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, educa-
tion and credit. Also presented are the models of proof used to
establish sex discrimination, the burden of proof under these
models and the difficulties encountered in proving discrimina-
tion. Recent case law is reviewed to provide an understanding of
the courts' interpretation and treatment of this legislation. This
article also explores legal questions not yet addressed by the
courts and issues on which lower courts presently conflict.
II. DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' as amended by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972" and the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978,' prohibits employer practices
that discriminate against workers in matters of hiring, discharge,
compensation, or terms of employment because of the worker's
race, religion, sex, or national origin. The Act applies to any
private employer, with at least fifteen employees, in an industry
affecting interstate commerce' and is applicable to federal, state,
and local governmental employers as well. Title VII also makes
it unlawful for an employer to segregate or classify by race, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin in any manner adversely affecting
the employee's job status.' The Act is administered by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with ultimate
enforcement by suit in a U.S. District Court by a private indi-
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e--2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 extensively amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act author-
ized the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bring actions directly against
respondents in federal district court when conciliation efforts prove fruitless. Prior to the
Act, an aggrieved individual had to pursue the case on her own. The 1972 Amendments
also enlarged the coverage of Title VII to reach smaller employers having at least fifteen
employees.
5. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
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vidual, the EEOC or the Attorney General. The EEOC has au-
thority to investigate complaints and decide whether unlawful
discrimination has occurred. Before filing suit, however, the
EEOC must attempt conciliation of Title VII claims.
Courts interpreting Title VII have permitted plaintiffs to
establish discrimination claims by showing either disparate
treatment or disparate impact. In the sex discrimination area,
most of the major developments have occurred through dispa-
rate treatment litigation. The Supreme Court has noted that,
conceptually, the theory of disparate treatment9 is the most eas-
ily understood type of discrimination. 10 The employer simply
treats some people less favorably because of their race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. Proof of an employer's discrimina-
tory motive is critical in a disparate treatment claim, although
in some cases the intent to discriminate can be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment."
A. Disparate Treatment
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,'2 the Supreme Court set
forth the order and allocation of proof for establishing whether a
discriminatory motive exists. First, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's acts consti-
tute a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove four
elements: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) that she ap-
plied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (3) that despite her qualifications she was re-
jected; and (4) that after her rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applications from per-
sons with plaintiff's qualifications.' 3 The establishment of the
prima facie case .under the McDonnell Douglas model creates a
9. The disparate treatment model of Title VII is based on section 703(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), which provides that it is an unlawful employment practice
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment" because of race or sex.
10. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1977).
11. Id.
12, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
13. Id. at 802.
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presumption of illegal discrimination by eliminating the most
likely legitimate case for the employer's action-a lack of mini-
mum qualifications and the absence of a job opening.
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and, there-
fore, a presumption of discrimination, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate some "legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" for the disparate treatment.14 The nature of the burden
which shifts to the employer to rebut a prima facie case was
clarified by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine.'5 The employer's sole obligation at
this second stage is simply to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason rather than establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that its proffered reason was the real reason for its ac-
tion, or that the person selected was more qualified than the
plaintiff.' 6
If the employer articulates a legitimate reason for disparate
treatment, the applicant must then prove that the employer's
rationale is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. 17
Burdine reemphasizes that the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with the plaintiff and does not shift at any point to the
defendant.'" The defendant's burden of production in rebutting
a prima facie case of sex discrimination only requires him to
raise a genuine issue of fact-he need not persuade the court he
was actually motivated by the articulated reason. 9
The female plaintiff in Burdine proved prima facie discrimi-
nation by a preponderance of the evidence. She was hired as an
accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC) of
the Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA). Burdine
received a promotion six months later, and following the subse-
quent resignation of her supervisor, was given additional duties.
The following year PSC, funded completely by the United
States Department of Labor, was reorganized to remedy ineffi-
ciencies, as a condition of the continued funding of the program.
To reduce the PSC staff, the defendant discharged Burdine
14. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
15. Id. at 248.
16. Id. at 254-56.
17. Id. at 254.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 255.
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along with two other employees and retained only one profes-
sional employee, a male. Burdine brought suit, alleging that the
decision to terminate her was discriminatory and in violation of
Title VII.
The Supreme Court in Burdine reversed the decision of the
lower court. The Fifth Circuit had placed an evidentiary burden
on the employer greater than the simple articulation standard,
reasoning that ". . . if an employer need only articulate, not
prove, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his action, he
may compose ficticious, but legitimate reasons for his action."20
The court then referred to two prior Fifth Circuit decisions" in
which it had developed two rules for a defendant to successfully
rebut a prima facie Title VII case. One rule required the defen-
dant to prove that the individual hired or promoted was better
qualified for the position than the plaintiff.2 The other rule re-
quired the defendant to prove the nondiscriminatory reason by a
preponderance of the evidence.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Burdine overruled both of
these Fifth Circuit decisions which placed a heavier burden of
proof on the employer.2 ' After Burdine, the evidentiary burden
required of a defendant in a disparate treatment claim is the
burden of production. The burden of proof remains at all times
with the plaintiff.
Disparate treatment of women may occur in hiring, firing,
discipline, promotion, transfer, layoff, compensation, training,
job assignment, and sexual harassment. Burdine serves as an ex-
ample of sex discrimination in the context of job termination. In
Perryman v. Johnson Products Company, 5 female employees
brought a class action against their employer, claiming disparate
treatment in its hiring, promotion and firing practices. The
plaintiffs introduced statistics indicating that historically the
20. 450 U.S. at 257-58 (quoting Turner v. Texas Instruments Inc., 555 F.2d 1251,
1255 (5th Cir. 1977)).
21. Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977); East v. Romine,
Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975).
22. Burdine v. Texas Department of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
23. Id. at 567.
24. 450 U.S. at 255-66.
25. 532 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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sales force of the company had been staffed by males.2 The em-
ployer failed to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its
practice of refusing to hire and promote women into the sales
organization of the company. The court concluded that the com-
pany's practices violated Title VII. The court also found the
company unlawfully retaliated against two of its female employ-
ees by firing them after they filed a sex discrimination charge
with the EEOC.27
In Commonwealth v. Flaherty,18 female members of a city
police department brought a sex discrimination claim, alleging
disparate treatment in the hiring and training practices of the
department. The plaintiffs established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, proving that from the time of their hiring as police-
women, they were treated differently from their male counter-
parts. The policewomen were excluded from firearms training,
which was a prerequisite to being promoted to the position of
graded detective. The reason given by the police department for
excluding these women from such training programs was that
those women hired prior to 1975 were not hired as police officers
but as "policewomen" and had not received all the required
training. The court found, however, that the job title "policewo-
man" had been abolished in 1973 and replaced by the title po-
lice officer. Also noted by the court was the plaintiffs' willingness
to participate in all required training. The court concluded that
the police department had failed to articulate a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for its actions, and that the plaintiffs had
therefore met their burden of proving sex discrimination.29
The plaintiffs in Perryman and Flaherty were able to meet
their burden of proving discrimination because the employers
failed to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.
But because employers can usually satisfy the burden of articu-
lating some "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the action
in question, most disparate treatment cases turn on the plain-
tiff's ability to demonstrate that the employer's nondiscrimina-
tory reason is pretextual.80 There are three categories of evi-
26. Id. at 375.
27. Id. at 377.
28. 532 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
29. Id. at 110.
30. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 14 (2d ed. 1983)
202 [Vol. 1
dence which the plaintiff can use to prove pretext: (1) direct
evidence of discrimination, such as discriminatory statements;
(2) statistical evidence; and (3) comparative evidence. 1
Direct evidence of discriminatory motivation is relatively
unusual.3 2 In Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc.,33 however, job ad-
vertisements which indicated the employer's hiring practices
were viewed as direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory
motive. Capaci and the EEOC brought suit against Katz &
Besthoff, Inc. (K & B), a drugstore company in New Orleans,
alleging discrimination in the hiring and promotion of females
into management positions. The EEOC relied on the content
and placement of job vacancy advertisements in newspapers as
evidence of discrimination.,4 The Fifth Circuit held that the ad-
vertising evidence of the employers hiring practices, while not
determinative, was useful and probative in establishing discrimi-
natory motivation. 5 In addition to the advertising evidence in
Capaci, there was strong statistical evidence. During the 1965-
1972 period, all 267 individuals promoted to the position of
manager trainee were male.s
Statistics concerning a defendant's employment policy and
practices, while not dispositive in an individual disparate treat-
ment case, may be helpful in proving pretext. In Sweat v. Miller
Brewing Co.,3 7 the plaintiff, a woman over forty, was discharged
from her position as an industrial relations representative and
replaced by two younger males. After bringing a sex and age dis-
crimination claim, the plaintiff sought statistical information re-
garding the sex and age of persons employed by Miller Brewing
as industrial relations representatives and managers. The lower
[hereinafter cited as EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW].
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.
33. 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 659. K & B's advertisements for management positions requested "qualified
young men"; for Personnel Director K & B sought "a vital aggressive man who is ready
to realize his potential." In contrast, for non-management positions, K & B advertised
positions for "counter girls" and "salesladies." Even when gender-neutral in content, ad-
vertisements for manager trainees were routinely placed in the "Help Wanted-Male"
column, whereas advertisements for secretaries, salesladies, and cashiers were placed in
the "Help Wanted-Female" column.
35. Id. at 662.
36. Id.
37. 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1983).
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court denied plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of the statis-
tical information and the plaintiff appealed. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that statistical information concerning an
employer's general policy and practice regarding the employ-
ment of a protected group may be relevant in showing pretext
and therefore discoverable, even in a case alleging an individual
instance rather than pattern and practice of discrimination. The
court also noted that liberal discovery rules should be applied in
Title VII litigation.8
Comparative evidence is frequently used to demonstrate an
employer's discriminatory motivation. 9 The plaintiff introduces
evidence showing that in a comparable factual situation, the em-
ployer treats individuals of one group less favorably than indi-
viduals of another.40
The plaintiffs in Chescheir v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.41 used comparative evidence to demonstrate the pretextual
nature of the defendant's reason for firing them. The defendant
stated that it discharged the plaintiffs, two female employees,
because they violated a company rule prohibiting adjusters and
first-year supervisors from attending law school. The plaintiffs
introduced evidence which established that the company's "law
school rule" was enforced discriminatorily on the basis of sex.
The evidence indicated that despite widespread rumors that two
male employees were attending law school, the employer chose
not to confirm his suspicions about their activities. Other evi-
dence showed that a third male employee was told, at the time
he was hired, that he could attend law school. In contrast, the
employer energetically investigated the women he suspected
were attending law school and immediately terminated those
found violating the rule. The Fifth Circuit found that the em-
ployer discriminated in subjecting female employees to a more
rigid enforcement of the'rule.42
The plaintiff in Martinez v. El Paso County48 used compar-
ative evidence to demonstrate the pretextual nature of the em-
38. Id. at 658.
39. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 30, at 15.
40. Id.
41. 713 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1983).
42. Id.
43. 710 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1983).
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ployer's reason for terminating him. Martinez, the only male em-
ployee in a clerical position at the El Paso Juvenile Probation
Department, was discharged from his job when the department
was reorganized. Martinez brought a sex discrimination suit and
proved a prima facie case. The employer's articulated reason for
firing Martinez was that he lacked the necessary typing skills to
perform the job. The plaintiff then offered evidence that a fe-
male employee whose typing skills were inferior to his was re-
tained by the employer. Martinez also introduced evidence that
the retained female employee was less cooperative, less exper-
ienced, and had less seniority than himself. The Fifth Circuit
held that the plaintiff proved the employer's articulated reason
for his dismissal was pretextual."4 The court noted that a plain-
tiff can prove an employer's discriminatory intent by demon-
strating either (1) that a discriminatory motive more likely moti-
vated the employer, or (2) that the employer's explanation is
unworthy of belief.45
Some courts have permitted employers to articulate a sub-
jective factor as their nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting a
job candidate. In Verniero v. Air Force Academy School District
#20,"' the plaintiff alleged that the defendant discriminated
against her in selecting males for two positions for which she
applied, Director of Special Education and Principal. The em-
ployer had specified three requirements for the position of prin-
cipal but hired a male lacking the third requirement, despite the
fact that Verniero met all three. The employer's articulated rea-
son for not selecting Verniero was that it doubted "her ability to
get along with people.' 7 Verniero argued that the articulated
reason was purely subjective. The Tenth Circuit held that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant's articulated reason
was pretextual."O The dissent, however, concluded that Verniero
had rebutted the employer's nondiscriminatory reason for her
rejection. The use of subjective factors by an employer, argued
the dissent, supports an inference of pretext, particularly where
an applicant from a protected group is objectively better quali-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 705 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 392.
48. Id.
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fled for the position. 9
Courts have also accepted the "exercise of traditional man-
agement prerogatives" as a legitimate reason for an employer's
actions. The plaintiff in Sweeney v. Research Foundation of
State University of New York5" alleged that she was denied ap-
pointment as a systems analyst because of her sex. Sweeney, em-
ployed in another area of the Research Foundation, had re-
quested a transfer to the systems analyst position in 1972. At
that time there were no openings in the department, but when
positions were available the following year, Sweeney was not of-
fered one. The employer's reason for not offering the job to
Sweeney was that, in the interim, she had successfully embarked
upon a new career in the Foundation's publications division.
The Second Circuit held that the employer's exercise of tradi-
tional management prerogatives was nondiscriminatory, and
that the plaintiff failed to persuade the court that the em-
ployer's acts were motivated by discrimination."
Proving disparate treatment does not ensure that a sex dis-
crimination victim will receive a fair remedy. In Ford Motor Co.
v. EEOC,2 the Supreme Court decided the proper remedy for a
victim of disparate treatment in hiring. Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor concluded that a rejected job applicant's obli-
gation under Title VII to minimize damages requires the appli-
cant to accept an unconditional offer of the job originally sought,
even if that offer does not include retroactive seniority.53
The plaintiffs in Ford were three women who were turned
down for auto industry jobs because of their sex. The women
filed discrimination charges against Ford Motor Company
(Ford) and found work elsewhere. Ford later offered the plain-
tiffs the jobs it had previously denied them, but did not offer the
seniority the plaintiffs would have earned had they been legally
hired when they first applied for the positions. Because they
were granted neither seniority nor job security, the plaintiffs re-
fused the job offers.
By the time of trial, the plaintiffs had been laid off from
49. Id. at 394 (McKay, J., dissenting).
50. 711 F.2d 1179 (2d. Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1187.
52. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
53. Id.
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jobs found after Ford's initial refusal to hire them, and the trial
court held that they were entitled to compensation for the pe-
riod after Ford's offer as well as before it. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that without a promise of retroactive senior-
ity, the defendant's job offer was "incomplete and unaccept-
able.""" The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion and held that the company's job offer was sufficient to
release Ford from further liability. 5
Justice O'Connor's opinion emphasized Title VII's "primary
objective"-to end employment discrimination. 5 To accomplish
this objective, she reasoned, the rules for implementing Title VII
should encourage defendants to make prompt unconditional job
offers to discrimination claimants.17 Tolling the accrual of back
pay liability when the defendant offers the claimant the job orig-
inally sought without accrued seniority, the Court noted, serves
the objective of ending discrimination by giving an employer an
incentive to hire the Title VII claimant." The Court concluded
that the rule adopted by the Fourth Circuit, requiring an em-
ployer to offer the discrimination claimant retroactive seniority,
fails to provide such an incentive because it makes hiring the
Title VII claimant more costly than hiring another applicant.0 9
The majority's employer-oriented approach to the issue re-
flects a lack of empathy for the problems of women in the non-
professional and blue-collar work force. In dissent, Justice
Blackmun maintained that the majority's approach encourages
employers to make "cheap offers" to victims of the employer's
past discrimination." The Court's decision, Blackmun argued,
violates Title VII's objective of making discrimination victims
"whole.""1 Had the plaintiffs accepted Ford's job offers, the dis-
sent noted, they would have been denied two years of seniority
and would have enjoyed lower wages, less eligibility for promo-
tion and transfer, and greater vulnerability to layoffs than per-
54. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
55. 458 U.S. at 241.
56. Id. at 228.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 229.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 250 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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sons hired after the plaintiffs were unlawfully refused
employment.2
Sexual Harassment
Title VII disparate treatment claims may relate to sexual
harassment when it operates as a term or condition of employ-
ment for an individual." To date, there has been no Supreme
Court ruling on a case involving sexual harassment.
In Bundy v. Jackson,64 the District of Columbia Circuit sig-
nificantly extended sex discrimination law, holding that sexual
harassment of a female employee by male supervisors in itself
constitutes a violation of Title VII.' Prior to Bundy, the deci-
sion in Barnes v. Costle66 represented the majority view. In
Barnes, the District of Columbia Circuit held that allegations of
sexual harassment, when coupled with an adverse employment
consequence, make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under Title VII. 7 To establish a prima facie case of sexual har-
assment subsequent to Barnes but prior to Bundy, a woman had
to show an adverse career consequence linked directly to the re-
jection of sexual advances from a superior authorized to make
employment decisions. Bundy, however, eliminates any require-
ment that plaintiff prove she resisted the harassment and that
an adverse employment consequence resulted from the
resistance.0 8
The court in Bundy also held that the McDonnell Douglas
burden of proof standards should be relaxed in sexual harass-
ment cases in favor of plaintiffs and made more stringent for
defendants.6' According to Bundy, after the employee estab-
lishes a prima facie case of sexual harassment, the burden shifts
to the employer to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
its decision was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory
grounds. 0 If the employer succeeds in meeting that burden, the
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
64. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
65. Id. at 942.
66. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 990.
68. 641 F.2d at 948.
69. Id. at 952.
70. Id.
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employee must then prove the employer's reason is pretextual.7
Although Bundy significantly extends the decision in
Barnes, it may be distinguished on its narrow facts in future de-
cisions.1 2 In Bundy, the plaintiff was sexually harassed by a co-
worker and various supervisors. . When she complained to her
supervisors' superior, he too propositioned the plaintiff.7 ' The
plaintiff then filed a formal complaint with the department di-
rector, who made no attempt to investigate the situation. A
question not resolved in Bundy is: what extent of harassment is
necessary to constitute a Title VII cause of action? The sexual
harassment in Bundy occurred repeatedly and was not discon-
tinued after the plaintiff's complaints. In future sexual harass-
ment cases, the existence of sexual harassment may not be as
apparent or as repetitious as in Bundy.
Similar to Bundy is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hen-
son v. City of Dundee,1 which held that a Title VII claim is
established when sexual harassment is sufficiently pervasive as
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment.7 ' The Henson court identified five ele-
ments a plaintiff must prove to establish a Title VII violation
based on sexual harassment when there is no tangible job detri-
ment:7" (1) respondeat superior;78 (2) the plaintiff belongs to a
protected group; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the
plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; and (5)
the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of em-
ployment. The court concluded that the state of psychological
well-being is a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment
within the meaning of Title VII.79
The Eleventh Circuit, in Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance
Services, Inc.,s0 relied on Henson in determining that the plain-
71. Id. at 953.
72. Annual Survey of Labor Law, 23 B.C.L. REv. 268 (1981).
73. 561 F.2d at 939-40.
74. Id.
75. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 901.
77. Id. at 903-05.
78. For a general discussion of the respondeat superior principle, see W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 458-91 (4th ed. 1971).
79. Id. at 904 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
80. 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983).
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tiff was subjected to sexual harassment during her employment
and wrongfully terminated as a result of the harassment."' Phil-
lips, employed by Smalley Maintenance Services (SMS), was
fired for refusing to engage in sexual activities with the presi-
dent of the company. The court concluded that the sexual har-
assment consisted of the effect on the plaintiff's psychological
well-being during her employment at SMS as well as her wrong-
ful termination.2
An employer who has knowledge of sexual harassment by its
supervisory personnel is liable for the harassment. The Fourth
Circuit, in Katz v. Dole,88 stated that once a plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing that sexual harassment took place, the most
difficult legal question will typically concern the responsibility of
the employer for the harassment."' The court distinguished two
types of sexual harassment: (1) harassment creating an offensive
environment ("condition of work"); and (2) harassment in which
a supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange for job
benefits.8 In "condition of work" cases, the court concluded, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had actual or con-
structive knowledge of the existence of a sexually hostile work-
ing environment and failed to take prompt and adequate action
to correct the problem. 6
The plaintiff in Katz, a former federal air traffic controller,
brought suit claiming she had been subjected to sexual harass-
ment by employees at the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), including her immediate supervisor and other supervi-
sory personnel. Katz alleged that the FAA workplace was per-
vaded with sexual slurs and innuendoes and that she was the
object of verbal sexual harassment. When Katz brought the har-
assment to the attention of her immediate supervisor, he re-
sponded with further sexual harassment. Katz then reported the
harassment to her supervisor's superior who reacted with
indifference.
The court held that Katz proved that her employer had no-
81. Id. at 1529.
82. Id.
83. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
84. Id. at 255.
85. Id. at 254.
86. Id. at 255.
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tice of the harassment and made no efforts to correct the situa-
tion.8 7 The court noted that a plaintiff may demonstrate em-
ployer notice by proving either that complaints were lodged or
that the harassment was so pervasive that employer awareness
may be inferred.8
The EEOC has issued Guidelines on Discrimination because
of Sex,89 which include sexual harassment.90 These Guidelines
were issued in response to increased complaints by female em-
ployees both of sexual harassment and of employer retaliation
against women who refused sexual advances. The Guidelines de-
fine sexual harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) sub-
mission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.9
Also delineated by the Guidelines are the notice require-
ments imputing liability to employers for the actions of their su-
pervisors and employees. The Guidelines expand employer lia-
bility, holding the employer responsible for acts of sexual
harassment between fellow employees" and for acts by non-em-
ployees93 in the workplace. The notice requirements necessary to
impute employer liability, however, are stricter when a co-
worker is involved than when advances are made by supervisory
personnel.9 4 When co-workers are the harassers, the employer is
liable only if the employer "knows or should have known of the
87. Id. at 256.
88. Id. at 255.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1983).
90. Id. at § 1604.11.
91. Id. at § 1604.11(a).
92. Id. at § 1604.11(d).
93. Id. at § 1604.11(e).
94. Compare id. at § 1604.11(c) with 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
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conduct."'" In addition, the employer is provided with a defense
if it takes "immediate and appropriate corrective action." '96
There is almost no case law holding an employer liable for co-
worker harassment. It remains to be seen whether courts will
impose employer liability only where the employer knew of the
conduct of its supervisors yet failed to take action, or whether
the more expansive employer liability concept expressed in the
EEOC Guidelines will be adopted by courts."
Courts have found that firing an employee for poor work
performance which results from sexual harassment violates Title
VII. In Lamb v. Drilko Division,8 the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the decline in the plaintiff's
work performance was a direct result of sexual harassment by
her supervisor.9 9 The court noted that the employer had, in ef-
fect, created the problem of the employee's poor work perform-
ance by failing to respond promptly to the employee's com-
plaints about her supervisor. 100
Requiring female employees to wear sexually provocative
uniforms which subject them to verbal and physical harassment
from the public also violates Title VII. In EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp.,'"' the court held that the defendant violated Title VII by
discharging the plaintiff for refusing to comply with the em-
ployer's dress policy. 02 The employer insisted that the em-
ployee, a lobby attendant, wear a revealing and sexually provoc-
ative uniform which subjected her to sexual harassment. The
court concluded that employers may no longer engage in con-
duct which allows women to be treated as sex objects.0 3
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1983).
96. Id.
97. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS 11 (1981).
98. 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
99. Id. at 107.
100. Id.
101. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
102. Id. at 611.
103. Id. at 610 n.16.
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B. Disparate Impact
A disparate impact claim of discrimination, 04 unlike a dis-
parate treatment claim, does not require proof of the employer's
discriminatory motive. 00 The focus in a Title VII disparate im-
pact claim is on the consequences of employment criteria and
practices. An employment practice or test, which is facially neu-
tral but operates to exclude a disproportionate percentage of a
protected class, violates Title VII unless the employer estab-
lishes that the practice is justified as a business necessity. Al-
though the adverse impact model may be used in individual
cases, it is most often used in class actions because, by defini-
tion, the employment practice in question must affect a pro-
tected group rather than just an individual.
The Supreme Court first articulated the disparate impact
model of discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.106 Some
commentators consider Griggs the most important court deci-
sion in employment discrimination law.10 7 The Court in Griggs
held that an employer's requirement of a high school diploma
and a satisfactory score on two aptitude tests, which excluded
black applicants at a substantially higher rate than whites, vio-
lated Title VII because the employer did not prove that the em-
ployment tests or diploma requirement were job related.108 The
Supreme Court noted that Title VII "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation."' 109
Griggs and its progeny have established a three-part analy-
sis of disparate impact claims. First, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a facially
104. The disparate impact model of Title VII liability is based on section 703(a)(2),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976), which forbids an employer "to limit, segregate, or clas-
sify" employees "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee" be-
cause of race or sex. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
105. Proof of discriminatory purpose is not necessary to prove the unlawfulness of
discriminatory procedures, for Title VII considers "the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971).
106. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
107. EMPLOYMENT DISCIMINATION LAW, supra note 30, at 5.
108. 401 U.S. at 432-33.
109. Id. at 431.
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neutral employment practice has a substantial adverse impact
on a protected group. At this stage, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff. If a showing of discriminatory impact is made, the em-
ployer must then demonstrate that the employment practice or
selection device is job related or otherwise constitutes a business
necessity. It has not yet been resolved whether, at this stage, the
defendant has a burden of production or persuasion. Following
Burdine, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff in a disparate
impact case also bears the burden of persuasion at all times."0
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that Burdine
does not apply to adverse impact cases and that the defendant
has a burden of persuasion at the second stage in an adverse
impact claim."' If the employer establishes job-relatedness or
another form of business necessity at the second stage, the
plaintiff must prove, at the third stage, that there are other tests
or selection devices with lesser adverse impact which would
equally serve the employer's needs."'
Courts have found a variety of employment criteria and
practices which have an adverse impact on women. Minimum
height and weight requirements as well as certain physical agil-
ity requirements have been found to impact adversely on female
job candidates. An employer using these requirements must
therefore demonstrate a business necessity for them. In Dothard
v. Rawlinson,"3 the Supreme Court rejected an employer's mini-
mum height and weight requirements for the position of prison
guard, where neither was shown to be job related.""
An employer's requirement that job applicants have a mini-
mum amount of work experience, when that requirement has a
disparate impact on women and is not justified by business ne-
cessity, violates Title VII. In Kilgo v. Bowman Transporta-
tion,1 5 a trucking company required that job candidates have
one year of "over-the-road" driving experience. The company ar-
110. Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (defendant's
rebuttal burden is to "come forward with evidence to meet the inference of discrimina-
tion raised by the prima facie case").
111. Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981).
112. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 801.
113. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
114. Id.
115. 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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gued that the requirement was adopted to reduce its accident
rate and insurance costs. The women challenging the require-
ment proved the existence of a less discriminatory alterna-
tive-the use of a trainee program such as the one previously
used by the company. The court held that the company's re-
quirement had a disparate impact on women,"' finding a dra-
matic underrepresentation of women among the company's over-
the-road drivers, even after adjusting for the fact that women
may not be interested in such jobs to the same degree as men.17
The court also concluded that the company had not shown the
requirement was justified by a business necessity. 18
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
were jointly adopted in 1978 by the EEOC, the Civil Service
Commission, the Department of Labor and the Department of
Justice."' The Uniform Guidelines provide the current "frame-
work for determining the proper use of tests and other selection
procedures" to help employers comply with Title VII's prohibi-
tion against discriminatory employment practices. 20 The Guide-
lines provide that if an employer's selection process for a job
does not have an adverse impact on a protected group, "in usual
circumstances," it will be unnecessary to validate the individual
components of the selection process.1 2' This "bottom line 122 ap-
proach was rejected, however, by the Supreme Court in Con-
necticut v. Teal. 28
In Teal, Connecticut's state welfare agency used a mul-
ticomponent selection process in considering candidates for a job
promotion. The first component, a written examination which
constituted a "pass/fail barrier" to further consideration for pro-
motion, had an adverse impact on black applicants. The pass
rate for black candidates was only about 68% of the pass rate
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1457.
118. Id. at 1467.
119. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 30, at 92.
120. Id. at 93.
121. Id.
122. Under the "bottom line" theory, an employer using an employment criterion
that has an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII can defend on the ground
that the adverse impact is offset by other measures and that the final result is an appro-
priately balanced work force. See Blumrosen, Bottom Line in Equal Employment
Guidelines: Administering a Polycentric Problem, 33 AD. L. REv. 323 (1981).
123. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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for white candidates. Despite the adverse impact of the written
exam, the employer promoted enough of the black candidates
who did pass the test to attain an appropriate balance in its
work force-the "bottom line." At the "bottom line," 22.9% of
the black candidates were promoted as compared to 13.5% per-
cent of the white candidates. The Justice Department joined
Connecticut in arguing that the selection process did not actu-
ally deprive disproportionate numbers of blacks of promotions.
The Supreme Court held, 5-4, that a nondiscriminatory
"bottom line" may not be asserted by an employer as a de-
fense. 2 4 A non-job related test which has a disparate impact and
which constitutes a pass/fail barrier, the Court reasoned, unlaw-
fully classifies employees into two categories-those eligible and
those not eligible for promotion. 25 Such a test violates Title VII
despite an employer's efforts to compensate for its discrimina-
tory effect. The Court concluded that Title VII protects every
"individual employee" against discriminatory treatment at every
step in the selection process. '26
In dissent, Justice Powell argued that the majority's deci-
sion blurs the distinction between disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact cases. 2 7 Absent a disparate impact on a protected
group, insisted the dissent, there can be no violation of Title VII
on the basis of the disparate impact model.'
The disparate impact model should not be used to challenge
multiple employment practices simultaneously, nor should it be
used to challenge any employment practice merely because an
imbalance in the composition of a work force exists. The Fifth
Circuit, in Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,12 9
noted that the disparate impact model is not "the appropriate
124. Id. at 456.
125. Id. at 452.
126. Id. at 453-56. But see Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982), where the
court held that a hiring barrier does not have a disparate impact on a protected group
when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.
127. 457 U.S. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting). The "bottom line" theory may not be obsolete
for all purposes. In a footnote, the majority pointed out that the Uniform Guidelines
regard the "bottom line" as a tool for the EEOC in deciding whether to take enforce-
ment action. But while the EEOC may choose not to sue an employer without "bottom
line" liability, the employer may still be confronted with a private lawsuit challenging an
aspect of its selection procedure. 457 U.S. at 453 n.12.
129. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
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vehicle from which to launch a wide ranging attack on the cumu-
lative effect of a company's employment practices."' 30
Pouncy, a black male, initiated a class action against his
employer, Prudential, alleging that Prudential had discrimi-
nated against its black employees by systematically failing to
promote them. Pouncy attempted to establish that three em-
ployment practices-the failure to post job openings, the use of
a level system, and the use of subjective criteria to evaluate em-
ployees-accounted for the racial imbalance in Prudential's
work force. 131
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that use of the disparate im-
pact model requires a plaintiff to identify a specific selection
procedure responsible for the adverse impact.13 This enables
the employer to respond by proving the legitimacy of the em-
ployment practice attacked. 33 The court acknowledged that the
statistics presented by Pouncy showed an overrepresentation of
blacks in the lower levels of Prudential's work force. 34 But be-
cause Pouncy failed to prove a causal connection between the
challenged employment practices and racial composition of Pru-
dential's work force, the court found that he had not established
employment discrimination based on the disparate impact
model.'35 The court also noted that a subjective classification
practice that depends on the employer's discretionary decisions
is not included within the category of facially neutral prac-
tices. 36 The court indicated, however, that it would have placed
a burden of persuasion on the employer to justify the legitimacy
of the challenged employment practices had Pouncy established
a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate impact
model. 1 7
Having found that the disparate impact model was not ap-
propriate for the plaintiff's claim, the court analyzed the case
under the disparate treatment model, for which a showing of
130. Id. at 800.
131. Id. at 799.
132. Id. at 800.
133. Id. at 801.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 800.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 801-02.
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discriminatory intent is necessary. 3 ' The court then concluded
that Pouncy's statistics failed to establish that Prudential's
black employees were victims of disparate treatment.139
In Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State University,' 0 the
Fifth Circuit, relying on Pouncy, applied a disparate treatment
rather than a disparate impact model to the plaintiff's sex and
race discrimination claim.14' Carpenter involved a class of ser-
vice/maintenance and clerical employees who brought a sex and
race discrimination suit against their employer, Stephen F. Aus-
tin State University. The plaintiffs alleged that the University
systematically assigned and promoted women and blacks into
lower-paying jobs.
The trial court analyzed the evidence under the disparate
impact model and found that the University had unlawfully
"channelled" blacks and women into lower-paying positions as a
result of specific employment practices. The court concluded
that the University had created a racially stratified and sexually
stereotyped work force, in which blacks were primarily employed
as janitors, cooks, and groundskeepers, and women were as-
signed to clerical positions. The channelling was attributed to
three employment practices: educational qualifications for job
assignments and promotions not proved to be job-related; sys-
tematic lower compensation for blacks and females by rates set
in the Classified Pay Plan;14'2 and subjectivity in initially as-
signing and promoting employees.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that its prior decision
in Pouncy required that subjective employment practices, such
as the University's systematic lower compensation and its sub-
jectivity in assigning and promoting employees, were not facially
neutral practices. 14  The court concluded that the latter two
practices should have been analyzed under the disparate treat-
ment model and remanded the case to the trial court for a find-
138. Id. at 802.
139. Id. at 802-05.
140. 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 620-21.
142. Id. at 625. The court concluded that the University's Classified Pay Plan was
marred by discretionary decisions on job ranking (level of pay primarily) as determined
by the all white, predominantly male, committee administering the plan.
143. Id. at 620.
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ing of discriminatory intent. " The court indicated that were it
not for the Fifth Circuit's prior decision in Pouncy, it would
have applied the disparate impact model to the case.
1 40
C. Wage Discrimination
Equal Pay Act
Sex discrimination in compensation is prohibited by the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 146 an amendment to the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 1938, 4 as well as by Title VII and, for
government contractors, by Executive Order 11375.48 The EPA
requires employers to pay members of both sexes the same
wages for substantially equal work, except when the wage differ-
ential is pursuant to one of four specified exceptions: (i) a se-
niority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differen-
tial based on any factor other than sex.
149
Unlike Title VII, the EPA is limited to sex discrimination in
compensation and does not address discrimination in other as-
pects of employment such as hiring, firing, promotion, or sexual
harassment. The EPA is administered by the EEOC but, in con-
trast to Title VII, the Act contains no requirement that the
EEOC conciliate claims before filing suit.150
To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under
the EPA, the plaintiff is required to show that the employer
pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for
equivalent work. The plaintiff must prove that the jobs being
compared require equal skill, effort and responsibility, and are
performed under similar working conditions.' 51 The defendant
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
147. S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963).
148. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 41 C.F.R. 60-20 (1983).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
150. EEOC v. Home Economy, 712 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1983); Ososky v. Wick, 704
F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). The EPA provides in relevant part:
No employer having employees subject to (the minimum wage provisions of the
FLSA) shall discriminate, within any establishment ... between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate
less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
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may escape liability by either refuting part of the prima facie
case or by pleading and proving one of the EPA's four affirma-
tive defenses as mentioned above.
The employer in Bence v. Detroit Health Corp.152 at-
tempted to prove that its pay differential was protected by the
third and fourth exceptions to the EPA. The health club paid its
female employees, who sold memberships to female customers,
lower commissions than male employees selling memberships to
male customers. The employer noted that there were more fe-
male customers at the health club, and, therefore, paying lower
commissions to female employees had the effect of equalizing
the total remuneration between female and male employees. The
employer argued that its pay differential was based on a "system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production."
The Sixth Circuit found that the employer's pay differential
violated the EPA. 18 The pay differential was not protected by
the third exception to the Act, the court reasoned, because
neither the quantity nor the quality of the female employees'
production differed from that of the male employees. The court
noted that female employees had to sell more memberships to
be paid the same as males, and that it was not easier to sell
memberships to women than to men.15 4
Also rejected by the court was the argument that the pay
differential was based on the EPA's fourth exception. The em-
ployer maintained that the difference in size of the markets for
male and female health club members was a "factor other than
sex." The court disagreed, noting that "any factor other than
sex" does not literally mean any other factor, but rather factors
traditionally used in job evaluation systems.'55
Bennett Amendment
Title VII was enacted by Congress a year after passage of
the EPA. To resolve any potential conflicts between Title VII
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions. . ..
152. 712 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1983).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1026-27.
155. Id. at 1029.
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and the EPA, Congress passed the Bennett Amendment to Title
VII.16 The Bennett Amendment provides that any wage differ-
ential authorized by the EPA shall not constitute a violation of
Title VII. 57 Plaintiffs unable to meet the Equal Pay Act's re-
quirement of "substantially equal" work have argued that Title
VII prohibits wage discrimination between employees perform-
ing dissimilar jobs of "comparable worth" or value to the em-
ployer. For many years, courts rejected "comparable worth"
claims on the basis that the Bennett Amendment restricts Title
VII's scope to "equal work" claims.
The proper interpretation of the Bennett Amendment was
determined by the Supreme Court in County of Washington v.
Gunther.8' In Gunther, a closely divided Court (5-4) held that
the Bennett Amendment does not limit Title VII wage discrimi-
nation claims to situations involving "equal work.' 5' The Ben-
nett Amendment merely incorporates into Title VII the four af-
firmative defenses contained in the EPA.1 60 After examining the
broad remedial policies behind Title VII and the EPA, the Court
stated it was imperative that Title VII not be interpreted in
such a way as to deprive discrimination victims of a remedy
without a clear congressional mandate. 1 '
The plaintiffs in Gunther, employed as guards in the female
section of a county jail, were paid 70% of what the male guards
received, despite their employer's estimate that the position of
female guard was worth 95% of the male guard position. The
plaintiffs claimed that part of this differential was due to inten-
tional sex discrimination. The Supreme Court found that the
employer's wage differential violated Title VII. For intentional
wage disrimination, the Court reasoned, jobs need not be "sub-
stantially equal" to be compared for the purposes of determining
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
157. The Bennett Amendment to Title VII provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
158. 425 U.S. 161 (1981).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 168.
161. Id. at 178.
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liability under Title VII. 1' 2 As a result of the Gunther decision,
plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of sex-based wage dis-
crimination without showing "substantial equality" of jobs.
The Gunther decision, while creating a new category of
wage discrimination suits, has been criticized. The Court ad-
dressed solely the issue of whether the Bennett Amendment, in
a case of deliberate discrimination, precludes a claim of discrimi-
natory undercompensation under Title VII. 163 The Court failed,
however, to provide guidance as to how these intentional wage
discrimination claims can be proved. Moreover, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, expressly declined to address the "con-
troversial concept of 'comparable worth.' "164
Comparable Worth
There are several interpretations of the comparable worth
doctrine. Under the "pure" comparable worth doctrine, discrimi-
nation exists when female employees in one job category are
paid less than male employees in a totally different job category
(e.g., nurses v. tree-trimmers) when the two groups are perform-
ing work which is not the same, but which is of comparable
worth to their employer. 65 Discrimination exists under the
"common" comparable worth doctrine when female employees
in one job category are paid less than male employees in the
same general job category (e.g., prison "matron" v. prison guard)
when the two groups are performing work different in content
but of comparable worth to the employer in terms of job
requirements.' 66
The comparable worth doctrine addresses employment dis-
crimination which results from classifying women into lower-
wage job categories. This doctrine challenges the underevalua-
tion of women's work, which is a product both of conscious dis-
162. Id. at 179.
163. Id. at 166.
164. Id. The concept of "comparable worth" has been the subject of much scholarly
debate. See, e.g., E. LIVERNASH, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (1980);
Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in
Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 231 (1980); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job
Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 397
(1979).
165. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE 1 (1981).
166. Id.
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crimination and unconscious social perceptions. 16 7 Despite the
enactment of Title VII and the EPA two decades ago, statistics
show that women still earn only fifty-nine cents for every dollar
earned by men."6 ' It is clear that without consideration of com-
parable worth claims, Title VII does not effectively combat sex
discrimination.
One commentator has noted that Gunther merely gives the
appearance of moving toward an acceptance of the comparable
worth theory." 9 Because Title VII does not provide an explicit
means of proving sex discrimination for jobs of comparable
worth, removing the equal work standard in Title VII suits is
analogous to taking down a fence so the plaintiff may run into a
brick wall.17' According to Eleanore Holmes Norton, the former
chair of the EEOC, comparable worth is the "most difficult issue
ever" to fall under Title VII.17 1 The EEOC does not plan to is-
sue formal guidelines on comparable worth in the near future,
but has instructed its compliance offices on how to handle com-
parable worth cases.17 2 There are already several post-Gunther
decisions addressing comparable worth issues.
A post-Gunther case which illustrates the difficulty in prov-
ing comparable worth is Blowers v. Lawyers' Cooperative Pub-
lishing Co. 173 The court in Blowers denied a motion to amend its
earlier holding, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Gun-
ther. In its previous decision, the court had refused to hold the
employer, Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Company, Inc., in
violation of Title VII for paying female employees lower wages
for work allegedly comparable in value to that of higher paid
male employees. The court concluded that the employees failed
to prove that the pay differentials were the result of intentional
sex discrimination.17 4 The court also held that the plaintiffs did
not adequately support their case on the broader claim of com-
167. Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview 69 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1130
(1981).
168. Id.
169. Comment, County of Washington v. Gunther: Movement Towards Comparable
Worth, 17 TULSA L.J. 327 (1981).
170. Id. at 345.
171. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE 3 (1981).
172. Id.
173. 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1222 (W.D. N.Y. 1981).
174. Id. at 1223.
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parable worth, which the Supreme Court in Gunther expressly
declined to sanction.'7
Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane17 6 is another post-Gunther case
in which the plaintiff was unable to prove intentional wage dis-
crimination. In Plemer, a female employee brought a Title VII
and EPA suit against her employer using statistics to show that
females occupied the lowest position on the employer's pay
scale. Noting that the case was not a "classic" equal pay claim,
the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to prove inten-
tional underpayment on the basis of sex.'77 The court refused to
make what it considered an "essentially subjective assessment"
of the value of the various duties and responsibilities of the posi-
tions to determine whether the plaintiff was paid less because
she was female.'78
It is uncertain whether courts will allow comparable worth
lawsuits based on the disparate impact model. Under the dispa-
rate impact model, Title VII would provide a cause of action
where employees performing work of comparable worth to their
employer are compensated unequally, regardless of whether the
employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex. A
plaintiff using the disparate impact model could demonstrate
that an employer's job classification scheme disproportionately
affects women without having to prove discriminatory motive.
Because the disparate treatment model requires a plaintiff to
cite a purposeful discriminatory act, it could be easier for a
plaintiff to prove wage discrimination, based on comparable
worth, by using the disparate impact theory.' 7'
Commentators have suggested that use of the disparate im-
pact doctrine for comparable worth claims furthers the social
policy of alleviating present harm due to past individual or soci-
etal discrimination. Professor Blumrosen has proposed that the
discriminatory factors which lead to job segregation are also re-
sponsible for wage differentials between segregated jobs, and
that an adverse impact of job segregation is a depressed wage
175. Id.
176. 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983).
177. Id. at 1131.
178. Id. at 1134.
179. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 30, at 477.
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rate for minority and female employees. 180 To establish a prima
facie case of wage discrimination under Blumrosen's theory, a
plaintiff must show job segregation-that the jobs were identi-
fied as either minority or female jobs- and that the wages in
the segregated jobs were at the low end of the employer's pay
scale. 181
Use of the disparate impact doctrine for comparable worth
claims has been criticized, however. It has been suggested that
comparable worth claims intrude further into employer preroga-
tives and labor-managements relations than Congress in-
tended." 2 An employer's wage policy may reflect goals only tan-
gentially related to a dollar measure of job content, such as
providing incentives for workers to perform well, reducing turno-
ver in key positions, and minimizing training costs.'83 It has also
been suggested that requiring employers to set wages according
to "job-related" factors alone conflicts with Congress's efforts to
ensure that Title VII does not infringe on an employer's rights
to run a business in the manner which the employer believes is
most efficient. 184 Critics of Blumrosen's thesis also maintain that
Title VII was not intended to address wage discrimination re-
sulting from job segregation.'85
D. Fringe Benefits
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, which makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to its . . . terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment," prohibits disparate treatment of women
and men with regard to fringe benefits.
The Supreme Court, in Los Angeles Department of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 8 struck down the employer's policy of re-
quiring female employees to make larger contributions than
180. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979).
181. Id. at 459.
182. Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1083, 1101 (1982).
183. Id. at 1101.
184. Id. at 1098.
185. Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth"
Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233 (1980).
186. 435 U.S. 703 (1978).
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male employees to its pension fund. The employer's reason for
collecting greater contributions from female employees was that
women as a class live longer than men. The Court rejected the
argument that the requirement for greater benefits was based
"on a factor other than sex"-i.e., longevity-and was therefore
permissible under the Equal Pay Act.1 87 An employer may not
defend a Title VII charge of sex discrimination in benefits, the
Court stated, on the basis that the cost of such benefits is
greater for one sex than the other.""8 The Court also found that
the use of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate retirement
benefits violates Title VII, whether or not the tables reflect an
accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a class, for
under the statute "even a true generalization about [a] class"
cannot justify class-based treatment.'
The relief awarded in Manhart was prospective only. While
acknowledging that the Albermarle"9 0 presumption in favor of
retroactive liability can seldom be overcome,' 9' the Court con-
cluded that special circumstances justified the denial of retroac-
tive relief. The Court reasoned that retroactive relief based on
drastic changes in the legal rules governing pension and insur-
ance funds could jeopardize the insurer's solvency and the in-
sured's benefits."9 2 The Court also explained that because courts
had been silent on the question, pension administrators may
well have assumed that the pension program was lawful."9 '
Because insurance companies have historically maintained
separate statistics on the sexes, operating under the premise
that women live longer than men, they frequently charge women
more for the same benefits men receive, or offer reduced benefits
to women for the same money men pay.'94 The employer in
187. Id. at 713.
188. Id. at 717.
189. Id. at 708.
190. In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court
reviewed the scope of a district court's discretion to fashion appropriate remedies for a
Title VII violation and concluded that "backpay should be denied only for reasons
which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradi-
cating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421.
191. 435 U.S. at 719.
192. Id. at 721.
193. Id. at 720.
194. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 30, at 382.
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Manhart administered the entire pension plan itself, without
the participation of an insurance company. In Arizona Gov-
erning Committee for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans v.
Norris,95 the Supreme Court determined the liability of an em-
ployer offering employees discriminatory pension plans adminis-
tered by insurance companies.
Arizona's pension plan gave state employees the option of
receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies se-
lected by the employer, all of which paid a woman lower
monthly retirement benefits than a man who had made the same
contributions. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected
the argument that the employer did not violate Title VII be-
cause private insurance companies actually calculated and paid
the pension benefits." Because employers are ultimately re-
sponsible for the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment provided to employees, the Court reasoned, an
employer that discriminates among its employees on the basis of
race, religion, sex or national origin violates Title VII regardless
of whether third parties are also involved in the discrimina-
tion.1 97 Also rejected by the majority was the employer's argu-
ment that sex-segregated actuarial tables accurately predict the
longevity of women as a class. The Court concluded that Title
VII requires employers to treat their employees as individuals,
not as components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class."
The trial court in Norris awarded the plaintiffs retroactive
relief, enjoining the employer to assure that future annuity pay-
ments to retired female employees would be equal to the pay-
ments received by similarly situated male employees. The Su-
preme Court, however, refused to grant retroactive relief and
held that the decision should be prospective only-for employee
contributions collected before the date of the decision, employ-
ers and insurers could continue to calculate resulting benefits
under existing methods.'"
Justice O'Connor joined the majority in finding that the em-
195. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
196. Id. at 3497.
197. Id. at 3496.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3498.
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ployer's practice violated Title VII. In the relief section of the
opinion, however, she voted with the four Justices who dissented
in the earlier parts of the opinion. Justice O'Connor's vote was,
therefore, critical in determining that the relief should not be
retroactive. In awarding prospective relief, Justice O'Connor rea-
soned that requiring employers to disperse greater pension bene-
fits than the collected contribution could support would jeopard-
ize the entire pension fund.20 She also noted that if the fund
could not meet its obligations, "[t]he harm would fall in large
part on innocent third parties.
2 0 1
Justice O'Connor's reasoning, while persuasive, is faulty be-
cause it fails to recognize that the "innocent third parties" are in
fact those retired females, who have received and will continue
to receive, lower pension benefits than male retirees. In focusing
on the plight of the employer rather than on that of the discrim-
ination victim, the Court fails to provide the female retirees with
an adequate remedy. The employer-oriented analysis used by
Justice O'Connor in Norris is similar to her analysis of the ap-
propriate remedy in Ford.02
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Parts I, II and
III of the opinion, disagreed with the relief awarded in Part
IV.208 Absent special circumstances, he noted, a victim of a Title
VII violation is entitled to whatever retroactive relief is neces-
sary to undo damage resulting from the violation. 0' Because the
Court's decision in Norris was clearly foreshadowed by Man-
hart, reasoned Justice Marshall, employers were on notice that a
sex-based pension plan was unlawful.20 5 Rather than making the
relief prospective, Justice Marshall would require that the post-
Manhart contributions of female employees be treated in the
same way as similarly-situated males.20 6
Each of the above cases of sex discrimination in fringe bene-
fits was brought under the disparate treatment model. Claims of
discrimination in fringe benefits have also been brought under
200. Id. at 3492, 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 3492, 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722-
23).
202. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
203. 103 S. Ct. at 3492, 3502-04.
204. Id. at 3503 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 3503-04 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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the disparate impact model. Facially neutral classifications re-
sulting in different fringe benefits for women and men violate
Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII, which prohibits employer classifi-
cations which "limit, segregate, or classify" employees in any
way which will deprive an individual of employment
opportunities.217
In Wambheim v. J.C. Penney, Inc.,0 8 female employees
brought a class action challenging provisions in J.C. Penney's in-
surance policy. The "head-of-household" provision in J.C. Pen-
ney's medical and dental policies permitted insurance coverage
for an employee's spouse only if the employee earned more than
the spouse. Statistics presented by the female employees indi-
cated that 12.5% of the married female employees qualified as
heads of households while 89.34% of the males qualified.2 09 The
statistics also indicated that most of the women at Penney's
worked in low-paying sales positions21
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs proved a prima
facie case of discrimination under the disparate impact the-
ory.21 ' The court found, however, that the employer had estab-
lished a business necessity for its head-of-household provision.1
The court noted that the rule established by the Supreme Court
in Manhart, that cost differential of providing benefits to male
and female employees is not a legitimate justification for inten-
tional discrimination, was not controlling.2 13 While cost differen-
tial is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for intentional
discrimination in providing fringe benefits under the disparate
treatment model, the court concluded that it is a legitimate bus-
iness necessity under the disparate impact model.2 "
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
208. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983).
209. Id. at 1494.
210. Id. at 1493.
211. Id. at 1495.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Pregnancy Discrimination Act
In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA)21' as Section 701(k) of Title VII.2 1 e The PDA was
passed by Congress to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.1 In Gilbert, the Court held
that an employer's disability plan, which excluded periods of
disability arising from or related to pregnancy or any unrelated
disability occurring while on a pregnancy/childbirth leave, did
not violate Title VII.2 '
The sponsors and supporters of the PDA were dissatisfied
with the Gilbert decision because they feared it would weaken
the position of women in the work force and jeopardize the
financial security of working women and the families they sup-
port.2" The PDA prohibits employer medical and disability
plans which exclude pregnancy coverage.
Since 1972, the EEOC has maintained that employment
policies or practices which discriminate against female employ-
ees affected by pregnancy, childbirth and related medical condi-
tions constitute disparate treatment based on sex.220 The EEOC
has taken the view that an employer may not deny its unmarried
employees pregnancy benefits.221 Another position maintained
by the EEOC is that if pregnancy coverage is given to female
employees, it must also be extended to the spouses of male
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981).
216. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides in relevant part that
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions, and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section
703(h) of this title [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)] shall be interpreted to permit other-
wise . ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981).
217. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). "The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Title VII
tends to erode our national policy of nondiscrimination in employment." H.R. REP. No.
95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4751.
See also S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
218. 429 U.S. at 129.
219. EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469, 1472 (7th Cir. 1983).
220. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (1983).
221. EEOC Questions and Answers on § 701(k), 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1983).
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employees.222
Until recently, the circuits were split on the issue of
whether an employer's health insurance plan, which provides fe-
male employees with hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-re-
lated conditions but offers less extensive pregnancy benefits for
spouses of male employees, violated the PDA. 28 The Supreme
Court resolved this conflict in its decision in Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.224
The employer in Newport amended its health insurance
plan after the enactment of the PDA. This revised plan provided
female employees with hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-re-
lated conditions to the same extent as for other medical condi-
tions, but provided less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses
of male employees. The employer challenged the EEOC's guide-
lines which indicated the amended plan was unlawful. The
EEOC then filed an action against the employer, alleging that
the employer's provision of hospitalization benefits discrimi-
nated against male employees.
The Supreme Court held that the limitation in the em-
ployer's amended health plan discriminated against male em-
ployees in violation of Section 703(a)(1).2 5 The employer's plan,
the Court reasoned, unlawfully gave married male employees a
less inclusive benefit package for their dependents than the de-
pendency coverage provided to married female employees.2 6
The Court concluded that the PDA proscribed distinctions in
medical coverage based on the pregnancy of either female em-
ployees or female spouses." 7
III. DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972228 was en-
acted to promote equal treatment of women and men in educa-
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (1979).
223. Compare Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 113
(4th Cir. 1982) (en banc), afl'd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983) (accepts EEOC view) with EEOC
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982) and EEOC v. Joslyn
Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejects EEOC position).
224. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2631.
227. Id.
228. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
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tion. The Act prohibits sex discrimination in education pro-
grams and activities receiving federal financial assistance. There
are two core provisions contained in Title IX.22 9 Section 901(a)
of the Act contains a program-specific ban on sex discrimination:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... 30
Under section 902, agencies awarding federal financial assis-
tance to education programs or activities are authorized to pro-
mulgate regulations to ensure compliance with section 901(a).11
Section 902 authorizes the termination of federal funds to the
program in which compliance is found, if compliance cannot be
secured by voluntary means. The Department of Education is
the primary administrator of federal financial assistance to
education. 2 '
Title IX does not expressly authorize a private right of ac-
tion by a person injured by a discriminatory educational pro-
gram. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,'" however, the Su-
preme Court held that a woman who is discriminated against on
the basis of sex by a federally funded educational program may
maintain a private cause of action."3 ' The plaintiff in Cannon
229. These sections of Title IX were derived from the virtually identical language of
Title VI of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), which prohibits race
discrimination in federally assisted programs.
230. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
231. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). Section 902 provides in relevant part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan,
or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901(a) of this title with respect to
such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general appli-
cability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the
statute. ...
232. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's responsibilities for educa-
tional institutions under Title IX were transferred to the Department of Education by §
301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat.
668, 678 (1979). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was then reorga-
nized as the Department of Health and Human Services.
233. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
234. Id.
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alleged that she had been denied admission to a medical school
receiving federal financial assistance, on the basis of her gender.
The Supreme Court concluded that Title IX impliedly provides
for private actions to vindicate the rights granted individuals by
the statute.30
The question of whether a plaintiff is entitled to a damages
remedy under Title IX was not addressed by the Supreme Court
in Cannon. In Lieberman v. University of Chicago,2 6 decided
after Cannon, the Seventh Circuit refused to imply a damages
remedy under Title IX.237 The plaintiff in Lieberman alleged she
was denied admission to Pritzker School of Medicine at the Uni-
versity of Chicago because of sex discrimination. After being de-
nied admission to Pritzker, the plaintiff decided to attend
Harvard Medical School, where she had been accepted, and
moved from the Chicago area. The plaintiff then sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive
damages.
Noting the availability of other remedies, including attor-
ney's fees, injunctive relief and federal administrative action, the
Seventh Circuit held that a damages remedy was not consistent
with the legislative purposes of Title IX.23 8 Because Congress
did not explicitly provide for a damages remedy, the court con-
cluded that the statute precluded such a remedy.3 9
The dissent in Lieberman viewed the majority's decision as
a "setback in Congress' attempt to ban sex discrimination. 2 4 0
Precluding a damages remedy, argued the dissent, will cripple
enforcement of the statute, and, in some cases, deprive a
wronged individual of a remedy.2 1
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a damages remedy
cannot be judicially implied under Title IX has also been criti-
cized by some commentators. Noting that the Seventh Circuit's
approach to interpreting Title IX is "restrictive," one commen-
tator has argued that a damages remedy could be an effective
235. Id. at 717.
236. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
237. Id. at 236.
238. Id. at 1188.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1194-95 (Swygert, S. J., dissenting).
241. Id.
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means for accomplishing the nondiscrimination objectives of Ti-
tle IX.24 2 Allowing such a remedy would enable courts to com-
pensate individuals wronged by Title IX violations, effectuate
the statute's purposes, and deter future violations.4 3
As a condition for its students receiving federal financial as-
sistance, educational institutions are required to file assurance of
compliance forms, indicating that the institution does not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. Courts have held that educational
institutions which receive no direct federal aid, but whose stu-
dents receive loans or grants, are recipients of federal financial
assistance within the meaning of Title IX. The Third and Sixth
Circuits have disagreed, however, on whether the Department of
Education has authority to terminate students' financial assis-
tance, based on an institution's failure to file an assurance of
compliance form in accordance with the regulations.
In Grove City College v. Bell, 24 4 the Third Circuit found
that the Department of Education was within its authority in
terminating federal financial assistance to students for the insti-
tution's failure to file an assurance of compliance form.45 Grove
City College, a private coeducational institution receiving no
federal or state financial assistance other than aid to its stu-
dents, refused to file the compliance form, asserting that it re-
ceived no federal financial assistance. Noting that the language
of section 901(c) extends Title IX's coverage to "any education
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance," the
court held that the statute encompasses all forms of federal aid
to education, direct or indirect.2 6
In determining that Grove was a recipient of federal
financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX, the court
also examined the legislative history of the Act. Observing that
Title IX is a counterpart of Title VI, the court reasoned that the
former should be similarly interpreted2 4' The court then relied
on the analysis used in Bob Jones University v. Johnson,2 48 a
242. Note, Lieberman v. University of Chicago: Refusal to Imply a Damages Rem-
edy Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 181.
243. Id. at 210.
244. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 691.
247. Id. at 697.
248. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Title VI decision which held that indirect federal financial assis-
tance brought a university within Title VI's coverage. The court
concluded that the language of Title IX, its legislative history,
post-enactment events, and the Bob Jones decision supported a
finding that Grove was a recipient of federal financial
assistance.249
Grove also argued that Title IX limits the Department's au-
thority to terminate federal funding to "the particular program"
which does not comply with the regulatory requirements. Be-
cause of Title IX's program specific language, Grove maintained,
only those activities or programs for which federal funds are spe-
cially earmarked are subject to funding termination. The court
held that Grove was incorrect in claiming that the program spe-
cific provisions of the statute preclude Title IX coverage when
indicrect aid is involved.2 50 Where the federal government fur-
nishes indirect or non-earmarked aid to an institution, the court
concluded, the "program" must be defined as the entire
institution.25
In contrast to the Grove decision, the Sixth Circuit, in Hills-
dale College v. Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare,252 held that terminating all student federal financial assis-
tance to an institution which is found to discriminate in a
particular program is inconsistent with the program-specific lan-
guage of Title IX.253 The court found, as in Grove, that Hillsdale
College was a recipient of the aid to its students. 54 Contrary to
Grove, however, the court reasoned that the entire college was
not a "program" within the meaning of Title IX, and concluded
that only the student loan and grant program was subject to Ti-
tle IX regulation. 2 5 Because the assurance of compliance forms
Hillsdale was required to file covered the entire college, and
were not limited to its student loan and grant program, the
court held that the regulation requiring execution of the form as
a condition for receiving student loans and grants was invalid.2 "
249. 687 F.2d at 696.
250. Id. at 701.
251. Id. at 700.
252. 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 430.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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The Third Circuit relied on its decision in Grove in deter-
mining whether a university's discriminatory intercollegiate ath-
letic program was subject to Title IX, where no federal funds
had been earmarked for athletics. In Haffer v. Temple Univer-
sity,257 university undergraduates brought a class action alleging
that Temple University discriminated on the basis of sex in its
intercollegiate athletic program. Conceding that it received sub-
stantial federal financial assistance, Temple argued that its in-
tercollegiate athletic program was exempt from the requirements
of Title IX because the university received no federal funds
earmarked for intercollegiate athletics. The court noted that
Grove rejected the assertion that the program-specific nature of
Title IX limits the authority of the Department of Education to
regulate only in those situations in which the federal monies to a
specific program be pinpointed.2"8 The court then concluded
that Temple University as a whole was the "program" for Title
IX purposes, and that its intercollegiate athletic program was
therefore governed by Title IX.2 59
In a broad interpretation of Title IX, the Supreme Court, in
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,2 60 held that employ-
ment discrimination comes within the Act's prohibition. In 1975,
HEW invoked its authority to issue regulations governing the
operation of federally funded education programs. Interpreting
the term "person" in Title IX to encompass employees as well as
students, HEW promulgated a series of regulations which dealt
with employment. In North Haven, two public school boards
brought separate suits challenging HEW's authority to issue
these regulations and claimed that Title IX was not meant to
reach the employment practices of educational institutions.
Prior to the suits, HEW investigated complaints about the
two public school systems, both of which were receiving federal
financial support. A complaint against the North Haven School
System was filed by a female tenured teacher whom North Ha-
ven had refused to rehire after she returned from a one-year ma-
ternity leave. Trumbull Board of Education, the other school
system under HEW investigation, had allegedly discriminated
257. 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
258. Id. at 16.
259. Id. at 17.
260. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
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against a female guidance counselor with respect to job assign-
ments, working conditions, and failure to renew her contract.
The Supreme Court concluded that the regulations promulgated
by HEW pursuant to Title IX were valid. The legislative history
of Title IX, the Court reasoned, demonstrated that employment
discrimination was intended to come within the statute's
prohibition. "'
IV. DISCRIMINATION IN CREDIT
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), " ' enacted as
Subchapter IV of the Consumer Credit Protection Act," 3 pro-
hibits discrimination by creditors "against any applicant on the
basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction. '"2 4
Congress empowered the Federal Reserve Board to promul-
gate regulations which effectuate the purposes of the ECOA.'"
Administrative enforcement responsibilities are assigned to sev-
eral agencies, depending on the creditor involved, and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) is charged with overall enforce-
ment authority."
A creditor who violates the Act is civilly liable to the ag-
grieved applicant for actual damages sustained.267 Actual dam-
ages can include injury to credit reputation, mental anguish, hu-
miliation, embarrassment, inconvenience as well as loss of
purchasing power and out-of-pocket monetary expenses.' 8 An
applicant may bring a claim against a creditor either individu-
ally or as a representative of a class. Injunctive relief and puni-
tive damages are also available under the Act.'
261. Id.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982).
263. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1982).
264. "It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant with
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or marital status, or age ... " 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1982).
265. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1983).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)-(d) (1982).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1982).
268. Owens v. Magee Finance Service, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 758, 770 (E.D. La. 1979);
Shuman v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1978). But see Cherry v.
Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a)-(c) (1982).
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The purpose of the ECOA is to eradicate credit discrimina-
tion against women, particularly married women whom creditors
have traditionally refused to consider for individual credit. The
ECOA, as originally enacted in 1974,270 established some protec-
tion against sex-based discrimination, but failed to treat all of
the important areas of potential discrimination in credit exten-
sion.' 71 The need for further antidiscrimination credit protection
resulted in the ECOA Amendments in 1976272 and an additional
implementing regulation, Regulation B.273
The ECOA Amendments significantly extend the scope of
the original Act. Prohibited criteria in the credit-granting pro-
cess now include age, race, color, national origin, religion, and
receipt of public assistance benefits.2 74 The Amendments au-
thorize the FTC to enforce the promulgations of the Federal Re-
serve Board, 27 5 and make the U.S. Attorney General a potential
ECOA enforcer.'7 If the agencies responsible for administrative
enforcement are unable to obtain compliance by their own ac-
tions, they may refer the matter to the Attorney General.2 7 The
Attorney General may also initiate a civil action on his own, if
he has reason to believe that one or more creditors are violating
the Act.278
The ECOA Amendments and Regulation B expressly re-
quire creditors to provide written notice27 1 of the specific reason
for any adverse action 280 taken against a consumer.2 1 This re-
quirement not only provides an applicant with the assurance
270. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521
(1974), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251-55 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§3 1691-1691(f) (1982)) was passed in 1974 and became effective in October, 1975.
271. Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and its Effects, 1981 Wis.
L. Rav. 655, 662.
272. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251-55 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f)
(1982)).
273. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1983).
274. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1982).
275. Id.
276. Id. at § 1691e(h).
277. Id. at § 1691e(g).
278. Id. at § 1691e(h).
279. Id. at § 1691(d)(1)-(3).
280. The term "adverse action" is defined in § 1691(d)(6) as "a denial or revocation
of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant
credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested."
281. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1)-(3); see also 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1983).
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that the credit rejection was legitimate, but also enables the ap-
plicant to attempt to improve her or his credit rating upon
learning the reason for the denial of credit. 82 The notice re-
quirement is particularly beneficial to female consumers who
have experienced difficulty as a group in securing credit.
The Fifth Circuit, in Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance
Corporation,2 83 held that the defendant failed to furnish a spe-
cific reason for denying credit to the plaintiff.28' The defendant,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), obtained a
consumer report containing erroneous credit information about
the plaintiff from a local credit reporting service. GMAC then
informed the plaintiff that his credit application had been re-
jected because of "insufficient credit references." The court
found that GMAC's explanation of refusing credit to the plain-
tiff did not satisfy the ECOA's objectives of educating and pro-
tecting the consumer.28 5 Because the written notice failed to in-
dicate either concrete criteria for the denial of credit or the
name and address of the credit bureau used by GMAC, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was denied an opportunity to cor-
rect the inaccurate information.""
The ECOA regulations specify what information may be re-
quested in a credit application. In general, "a creditor may re-
quest any information in connection with an application. 2 8 7 A
creditor may not, however, request information concerning the
birth control practices and child-bearing intentions or capability
of a female credit applicant s8 If a woman applies for individual
282. As explained in the Senate Report accompanying the 1976 amendments to the
ECOA, Congress viewed the strict notice requirement as:
a strong and necessary adjunct to the antidiscrimination purpose of the legisla-
tion, for only if creditors know they must explain their decisions will they effec-
tively be discouraged from discriminatory practices. Yet this requirement fulfills
a broader need: rejected credit applicants will now be able to learn where and
how their credit status is deficient and this information should have a pervasive
and valuable educational benefit. ...
S. REP. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in (1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 403, 406.
283. 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983).
284. Id. at 147.
285. Id. at 146-48.
286. Id.
287. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b)(1) (1983).
288. Id. at § 202.5(d)(4).
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unsecured credit, a creditor may not inquire into her marital
status.2 89 A creditor is also prohibited from requesting any infor-
mation about a woman's ex-husband, unless the woman is rely-
ing on alimony or child support as a source of funds to repay a
loan. When a woman applies for her own credit and relies on her
own income, information about her spouse or his co-signature
can be required only under certain circumstances.2 90
In Anderson v. United Finance Company,191 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a lender's request for a spouse's signature on a
note, where a female applicant has applied for and been granted
a loan individually, violates the ECOA. 2 The plaintiff in An-
derson requested the defendant to place the loan for which she
applied in her name because she was attempting to establish in-
dividual credit. The defendant made out the loan to both the
plaintiff and her spouse, and issued the check solely in the name
of the plaintiff's spouse. The lower court held that such a "tech-
nical violation" did not result in discrimination under the
ECOA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the violation
was "just the type of discrimination which the Act was created
to prohibit. 2 93
A lender may insist on the signature of the credit applicant
and her spouse if state law requires both signatures to create a
valid lien. In McKenzie v. U.S. Home Corp.,29" the plaintiff ap-
plied through the defendant's mortgage corporation for a loan to
purchase a home. At that time, McKenzie was separated from
her husband and divorce proceedings were pending. The mort-
gage corporation instructed McKenzie that the loan could not be
made unless the divorce became final or McKenzie's husband
signed the deed of trust. The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that
she was denied credit because of her marital status. The defen-
dant relied on 15 U.S.C. 1691d(a) which provides: "A request for
the signature of both parties to a marriage for the purpose of
creating a valid lien . . . shall not constitute discrimination
... " The Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's requirement
289. Id. at § 202.5(d)(1).
290. Id. at § 202.5(d)(2).
291. 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1982).
292. Id. at 1276.
293. Id.
294. 704 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983).
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that the plaintiff's husband sign the deed was not impermissible
discrimination on the basis of marital status. 95
The ECOA prohibits not only overt discrimination by credi-
tors, but also facially neutral practices which are discriminatory
in effect.296 The legislative history of the ECOA indicates that
the disparate impact model applies to credit discrimination.297
In addition, Regulation B cites the Congressional intent to ana-
lyze credit discrimination claims under the disparate impact
model.2 8
The ECOA regulations prohibit creditor practices which
have a discriminatory impact. For example, the regulations pro-
hibit a creditor from excluding part-time income in assessing an
applicant's creditworthiness. Discounting part-time income,
though neutral on its face, has the effect of discriminating
against women. 299 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
issue of whether the disparate impact model is appropriate for
cases brought under the ECOA. One commentator has argued
that the legislative history of the Act and the accompanying reg-
ulations indicate that courts should apply the disparate impact
test in the ECOA area.3 0
0
The Ninth Circuit, in Miller v. American Express Co.,30 1
held that, in some instances, a plaintiff may prove an ECOA vio-
lation without showing discriminatory intent or disparate im-
pact.2 Miller brought an action against American Express
(AMEX) when her account was automatically cancelled after her
husband's death. Miller's account, while supplementary to her
295. Id. at 779.
296. Section 701(a) of the ECOA provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any credit
transaction to discriminate against any applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction on the basis of race . . . sex or marital status ... " 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)
(1982).
297. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in (1976) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 403, 406 ("[i]n determining the existence of discrimination.., courts or agen-
cies are free to look at the effects of a creditor's practices as well as the creditor's motives
or conduct in individual transactions. . . ."); H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1975) (statutory provisions not intended to limit use of population statistics to establish
prima facie case of discrimination "in accordance with the 'effects' test.
298. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 n.7 (1983).
299. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1983).
300. Blakely, Credit Opportunity For Women: The ECOA and its Effects, 1981 Wis.
L. REV. 655, 672-73.
301. 688 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982).
302. Id. at 1239-40.
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husband's basic account, was a separate account for which she
was contractually liable. She claimed AMEX had violated the
ECOA in terminating her account after her marital status
changed from married to widowed.
AMEX argued that Miller failed to show that AMEX's
practice of cancelling the accounts of supplementary cardholders
on the death of the basic cardholder was adopted with discrimi-
natory intent or had an adverse impact on widows as a class.
The cancellation policy was not discriminatory, AMEX main-
tained, because it applied to all supplementary cardholders, in-
cluding widows, widowers, siblings and children of the basic
cardholder.
The court concluded that AMEX's policy violated the
ECOA's provision which prohibited creditors from discriminat-
ing with respect to any credit transaction on the basis of marital
status. 03 The court relied on 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(c)(1) which pro-
vides that a creditor must not terminate the account of a person
who is contractually liable on an existing account on the basis of
change in marital status, in the absence of evidence of inability
or unwillingness to repay. This regulation, reasoned the court, is
addressed directly to one of the evils that the ECOA was
designed to prevent-loss of credit because of widowhood.304
The court concluded that AMEX's conduct was within that pro-
hibited by the regulation and that proof of credit discrimination
is not limited to the two traditional Title VII tests for employ-
ment discrimination.3 0 5
V. CONCLUSION
Title VII, Title IX, and the ECOA are potentially effective
instruments for combating sex discrimination in employment,
education, and credit. Recent case law indicates that courts have
taken both restrictive and expansive approaches to this legisla-
tion. Effectuating the remedial purpose of Title VII, Title IX,
and the ECOA will depend on consistent judicial willingness to
interpret these statutes broadly.
A major obstacle for Title VII claimants has been proving
303. Id. at 1240.
304. Id. at 1238.
305. Id. at 1240.
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discrimination under the disparate treatment model. Because
courts are lenient in what they accept as a legitimate non-dis-
criminatory reason for an employer's actions, an employer can
usually carry its burden of production. A plaintiff proving dispa-
rate treatment will, therefore, usually have to establish that the
employer's articulated reason is pretextual. Even if a plaintiff is
able to establish disparate treatment, she still faces the possibil-
ity of receiving an inadequate remedy. The unjust remedies
granted in Ford and Norris reflect the Supreme Court's concern
for protecting employers and the Court's relative indifference to
a discrimination victim's need to be made "whole."
Case law in the area of sexual harassment, one form of dis-
para-te treatment, is still developing. Whether the employer in
sexual harassment cases carries a burden of persuasion, as indi-
cated in Bundy, needs to be clarified. The EEOC Guidelines on
sexual harassment, which are more expansive than existing case
law, have not yet been widely interpreted. Employer liability for
the discriminatory acts of supervisors has been established, but
there is almost no case law on co-worker harassment. It is likely
that the issue of sexual harassment will eventually reach the Su-
preme Court-perhaps on a direct challenge to the EEOC
Guidelines.
Proving disparate impact may be easier for Title VII claim-
ants, in some instances, because this model does not require
proof of the employer's discriminatory intent. The Supreme
Court has not yet resolved the critical question, on which the
circuits have conflicted, of whether an employer carries a burden
of persuasion or production in a disparate impact claim. The
Fifth Circuit's decisions in Pouncy and Carpenter limit the use
of the disparate impact model to situations in which there is a
causal connection between a specific employment practice and
the disparate impact. Pouncy and Carpenter also require use of
the disparate treatment model if the challenged employment
practice is the result of the employer's subjective discretionary
choices rather than facially neutral employer policy. Whether
the Supreme Court will similarly restrict the use of the disparate
impact model remains to be seen. The Ninth Circuit, in
Wambheim, indicated that cost differential, while not a legiti-
mate reason for disparate treatment, can be a legitimate busi-
ness necessity under the disparate impact model. It is unclear
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whether the other circuits and the Supreme Court will view cost
differential as a legitimate business necessity in disparate impact
cases.
Courts will probably address comparable worth issues in
more detail, now that the Supreme Court has determined the
proper interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. So far, post-
Gunther decisions demonstrate judicial reluctance to endorse
the comparable worth concept. Courts are particularly unwilling
to make what they consider subjective assessments of job
"worth." Whether judicial resolution will be favorable to the
comparable worth doctrine is still uncertain. If the resolution is
unfavorable, Congress could amend Title VII to endorse the con-
cept. Without the use of the comparable worth doctrine, wage
discrimination cannot be adequately addressed. Significant op-
position exists to using the disparate impact model for compara-
ble worth claims. It remains to be seen whether comparable
worth, if accepted, will be restricted to disparate treatment
claims, in which the plaintiff has the burden of proving inten-
tional wage discrimination.
There has been very little case law on Title IX. The Su-
preme Court has interpreted Title IX as providing a private
cause of action. The Seventh Circuit, however, subsequently re-
fused to imply a damages remedy for the statute. The Supreme
Court has held that sex discrimination in employment comes
within Title IX's prohibition. An issue not yet resolved by the
Supreme Court is whether the program-specific language of the
statute limits funding termination to only those discriminatory
programs for which federal funds have been earmarked.
As with Title IX, not much case law exists interpreting the
ECOA. To date, there has been no Supreme Court decision on
the statute. Existing case law indicates that use of the disparate
impact model is appropriate for ECOA claims because discrimi-
natory intent is often absent in credit discrimination. The Miller
decision suggests that a plaintiff can prove an ECOA violation
without establishing discriminatory intent or disparate impact.
Whether ECOA claims will be limited to the models of proof
used in employment discrimination or whether the more expan-
sive Miller interpretation will be followed is unclear.
Examination of Title VII, Title IX, and the ECOA reveals
that important statutory protections exist against sex discrimi-
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nation in employment, education, and credit. This legislation
may prove adequate to ensure equality for women, at least
within the areas the Acts address. As we have observed, how-
ever, the efficacy of the statutes' protection depends upon a con-
sistently broad reading of their language by the courts. A na-
tional mandate against sex discrimination is needed to guide the
courts in interpreting this legislation and resolving the critical
issues mentioned above. The defeat of the ERA, however, signi-
fies political and societal reluctance to support such a mandate
at this time. 06 But until a national policy of eliminating sex dis-
crimination is adopted, women cannot be guaranteed adequate
interpretation and enforcement of the existing statutory
protections.
Laura Buckley
306. H.R.J. Res. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REC. H46 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983). The
ERA was reintroduced in the House on January 3, 1983, but was defeated on November
18, 1983. The 278 to 174 vote fell short of the required two-thirds majority.
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